The argument from inconsistent revelations is an argument against the existence of God. It asserts that it is unlikely that God exists because many theologians and others who profess to reveal God and his ways to us have produced conflicting and mutually exclusive revelations. Since all of us not privy to revelation must either accept it or reject it upon the authority of its proponent, and there is no way for any mortal to resolve these conflicting claims against one another, it is prudent to reserve judgment on them all.

This argument can be seen as the reverse of Pascal's Wager, and frequently arises as an objection to the argument of the Wager. The Wager invites you to accept God's existence in the absence of proof, as the best strategy should God in fact exist. This argument points out that, given the content of proposed revelations, acceptance of one entails rejection of another; the wager therefore gives no assurance that you have in fact made the safest bet.

Christians believe (often claiming to know) that Jesus is the savior of the world. Jews believe as strongly he is not. Similarly, Christians claim to know Jesus is the Messiah, and many Jews claim to know he isn't. In both cases the information supposedly comes from the same God. Muslims, of course, reject both claimed revelations in favour of those of their own religion. Acceptance of any one of these religions implies rejection of the others. Faced with these competing claims, in the absence of a personal revelation to the believer it is impossible to decide among them; and were a personal revelation to be granted to one believer, this would only duplicate the problem in each person the believer shares his revelation with.

Likewise, prayer may result in conflicting petitions addressed to the same God. On different sides of a battle or a football game, players and fans pray for victory to different Gods, or to the same God. God cannot simultaneously grant all of these prayers; therefore, for any one side to have claimed that God granted their prayer is not a falsifiable hypothesis.

Believers have a number of stratagems to counter this argument. It assumes, for example, that none of them make verifiable predictions about what can be found in history or science. The presence of a testable proposition in a revelation may provide a way to assess the credentials of the prophet who claims to speak for a deity; an error about an inter-subjectively demonstrable fact casts doubt on the remaining propositions that cannot be verified.