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The Iraqi resistance is composed of over a dozen major insurgent organizations and countless smaller cells. It can be subdivided into three main ideological strands: Ba'athism, nationalism, and Islamism.
The Ba'athists are composed of former Ba'ath Party officials, the Fedayeen Saddam, and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence and security services. Their goal, at least before the capture of Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist regime to power.
The nationalists are composed of former members of the Iraqi military as well as some ordinary Iraqis. Their reasons for opposing the occupation vary between a rejection of the foreign presence as a matter of principle to U.S failure to restore security and basic services or quickly hand over power. Many Iraqis who have had relatives killed by American soldiers may also be involved in the nationalist resistance as part of the Iraqi code of tribal revenge. Beyond the expulsion of U.S troops from Iraq, there is no coherent political goal being pursued by the Iraqi guerillas fighting under the banner of nationalism.
The Islamist resistance is composed of two main factions. The first is composed of Iraqis belonging to the Salafi branch of Sunni Islam, which advocates a return to the pure Islam of the time of the Prophet Mohammed and opposes any foreign non-Muslim influence. The beliefs and practices of Salafi Islam are similiar to the Wahabi sect of nearby Saudi Arabia, of which Osama bin Laden is a member. The other is composed of foreign fighters who have entered the country and see Iraq as the new "field of jihad" in the battle against U.S forces. It is generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of al-Qaeda and the related group Ansar al-Islam may be involved. The Islamists have steadily gained in influence within the Iraqi resistance since the insurgency began and were poised following the capture of Saddam Hussein to take the leading role in the insurgency from the dwindling Ba'athists.
Estimates on the total number of Iraqi guerillas varies. The U.S military estimates that around 5,000 fighters form the core of the movement, along with many other active sympathizers and part-time insurgents who altogether may total 50,000 strong (according to a CIA report). The most intense insurgent activity takes place in Baghdad and a triangle stretching west from the capital to the town of Ramadi and north to Tikrit in an area known as the Sunni Triangle. Guerilla activity also takes place around al-Qaim in western Iraq and around the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk to the north, as well as some other areas of the country.
The Iraqi resistance is almost excusively composed of Sunni Arabs and is estimated to be 90% indigenous. The other 10% is composed of foreign fighters from other countries, mainly of the Wahabi sect of Sunni Islam. Sunni Arabs occupied most positions in the former regime, and lost both material wealth and a sense of identity following the fall of Saddam Hussein's government. Saddam Hussein's government insitituted a neopatrimonial system in which tribes that remained loyal received money, aide, and other favors from the government. Members of these once favored tribes, especially the al-Tikrit tribe, now form much of the resistance. A few continued to cling to the goal of restoring Ba'athism while others turned to religious extremism to fill the vacuum of power. Tribes who occupied favored positions in the former regime's neopatrimonial system do not form all of the resistance, however. Samarra, for an example, which is now a flashpoint for Iraqi guerillas, fell out of favor with Saddam's regime and was a rival of his nearby hometown of Tikrit.
Iraqi guerilla attacks typically take the form of attacks on U.S convoys and patrols using improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. These bombs, formed from former Iraqi military armaments and/or homemade materials, are camouflaged on main roads and detonated either by remote control or by wire when a convoy or patrol passes. Another common form of attack involves hit-and-run mortar strikes on U.S bases. Insurgents fire a few mortar rounds or rockets and quickly escape before their position can be identified by U.S forces. Since the beginning of November, helicopters have also been increasingly targeted. The insurgents, often concealed in palm groves, lie in wait for the helicopters and then attack the helicopter from the rear. The weapons used include rocket-propelled grenades and heat-seeking shoulder fired missiles such as the SA-7, SA-14, and in one case the SA-16. Suicide car-bombers are used in larger attacks to gain maximum media attention. Most attacks formerly took the form of ambushes involved rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire, but these type of attacks have been reduced in favor of strikes involving no direct contact to reduce the chance of insurgent casualties.
The Iraqi guerillas typically operate in small squad sized formations of 5-10 men. Fighters are rarely concentrated in larger numbers in order to escape American attention. Occasions where fighters were concentrated in larger numbers included a battle near the town of Rawa on June 13 near the Syrian border and a large coordinated ambush of a convoy in the town of Samarra on November 31. Both involved groups of roughly 100 fighters.
Insurgent saboteurs have also repeatedly assaulted the Iraqi oil industry. Guerillas, using either rocket-propelled grenades or explosives, regularly destroy portions of oil pipeline in northern Iraq. This sabotage has set back reconstruction efforts and contributed to Iraq's fuel shortage, which is one of the factors that has generated discontent with the occupation. The reason the Iraqi resistance gives for the sabotage is to prevent a U.S seizure of Iraqi oil, which opponents of the occupation believe is one of the main reasons for the invasion. Coalition officials contend the sabotage is intended to set back reconstruction efforts and to push back progress in Iraqi society towards democracy. There have also been allegations of attacks on water pipelines and the electrical grid by the Iraqi insurgents, although there is controversy as to whether the incidents in question did indeed represent intended sabotage.
There also have been several attacks on non-military and civilian targets, especially since August of 2003. These includine the assasination of Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Governing Council and suicide bombings targeting the U.N, the Jordanian Embassy, Shiite mosques, the International Red Cross, the Iraqi police, Kurdish political parties, and a resturant. Guerillas also target private contractors working for the coalition as well as non-U.S coaltion military personell. The number of these attacks on "soft targets" has steadily increased.
The total number of guerilla attacks on U.S forces since the beginning of June has remained steady at between 12 and 20 attacks per day, with the exception of a surge of attacks in November of 2003 during which as many as 50 attacks per day were reported on some days. As of February 6, 2004, 621 coaltion soldiers have been killed since the war in Iraq began, 529 of them American. 3,003 U.S soldiers have been wounded.
A great deal of attention has been focused on how much support the guerillas have among the Iraqi population and on winning "hearts and minds." It appears as though the Iraqi resistance retains a degree of popular support in the Sunni Triangle, especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal nature of the area and its concepts of pride and revenge, the prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense U.S counterinsurgency operations have resulted in the harsh opinions many Sunni Arabs have for the occupation. Outside the Sunni Triangle and in the Shiite and Kurdish areas, violence is mostly eschewed. Many, however, especially in the Shiite community, are displeased with various aspects of the U.S-led occupation. Spontaneous peaceful protests have appeared in Shiite areas against the occupation. Many Shiites and Kurds, however, suffered heavy persecution under the rule of Saddam Hussein's regime and are much more reluctant to use violence against coaltion forces.
In late January and early February 2004 a joint statement was distributed in leaflet form by a dozen resistance organisations vowing to take control of Iraqi cities after US-led occupation forces withdraw, and portraying the US-led coalition's planned withdrawl as a defeat. Iraqi civilians' reaction to the statement are reported to vary widely, from being "hailed as the manifesto for a legitimate resistance movement" to being dismissed "as mere bravado".
Major Iraqi guerilla groups include, but are not limited to, the following:
Composition of the Resistance
Size and Scope of Resistance
Makeup of Iraqi Resistance
Iraqi Guerilla Tactics
Number of Attacks and Coaltion Casualties
Support for resistance among the Population
Iraqi Resistance Organizations
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