| |
|
The name of the barrier is itself a political issue. Israel uses the name separation fence (gader ha'hafrada) in Hebrew and "security fence" in English, with "seam zone" referring to the land surrounding the fence. Opponents prefer to call it a "wall", with "Apartheid wall" being a common derogatory name for it.
There is already a similar barrier, the Israeli Gaza Strip barrier, inside the Gaza Strip.
| Table of contents |
|
2 Structure and Timeline 3 Effectiveness 4 International and Israeli legal aspects 5 Opinions on the barrier 6 See also 7 External Links |
Although at the beginning the Israeli government was hesitant, it finally embraced the plan and says that the purpose of the barrier is to prevent terrorists from entering Israeli cities, a problem which has plagued Israel since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Its secondary purpose is to prevent illegal infilitrations by Palestinians, mainly illegal immigrants and car thieves. The government says that the high concrete portions are to protect cars and people on the Israeli side from gunfire.
Most of the barrier consists of a wire fence with an exclusion area on each side. Some sections, in particular those near Qalqiliya and Jerusalem, consist of a concrete wall up to 8 meters (25 feet) high. Some sections include a trench on one side. Most of it so far consists of a wire fence with an exclusion area on each side. In both cases there are regular observation posts, automated sensing devices and other apparatus. There are gates at various places which are controlled by Israeli soldiers when they are not closed.
The total length of the fence (as officially authorized by the end of 2003) will be 650 kilometers (403 miles).
As of November 2003, the barrier extends inside most of the north-western and western edges of the West Bank, sometimes close to the 1949 armistice line between Israel and Jordan (the "green line"), and sometimes running further east. In some places there are also secondary barriers, creating a number of enclaves completely enclosed by barriers. It is not known whether a decision has been made to build a barrier also on the eastern side of the main regions of Palestinian population. Depending mostly on this decision, somewhere between 6% and 45% of the West Bank will eventually be outside the barrier.
In October 2003, the region between the barrier and the "green line" was declared a special military area. Although all Israelis and all Jews regardless of nationality can enter the region freely, Palestinians can enter only with special permits even if they are residents of one of the dozen or so Arab villages in the region. Many of the latter Arabs who tried to obtain permits were refused them.
In February 2004, Israel said it would review the route of the barrier in response to US and Palestinian concerns. In particular, Israeli cabinet members said modifications would be made to reduce the number of checkpoints Palestinians had to cross, and especially to reduce Palestinian hardship in areas such as Qalqilya where the barrier goes very near, and in some cases nearly encircles, populated areas.
Israeli officers, including the head of the Shin Bet, quoted in the newspaper Maariv, have claimed that in the areas where the barrier was complete, the amount of hostile infilitrations has decreased to almost zero. Maariv also stated that Palestinian militants, including a senior member of Islamic Jihad, had confirmed that the barrier made it much harder to conduct attacks inside Israel. In the Gaza Strip, which is surrounded completely by a fence, there has been almost no infilitrations of suicide bombers into the nearby cities Ashkelon and Sderot or into the Kibbutz Nahal Oz. The Palestinians, in recognition of the effectiveness of the fence, have responded with suicide bombings at the checkpoints in the fence that allow Palestinians entry into Israel and the Erez Industrial Zone.
According to Lt. Col. Dotan Razili of the Israeli Defense Forces barriers of this type are highly effective as "there have been almost no penetrations through the Gaza fence since 1996". (paraphrase from The Lehrer News Hour of Public Broadcasting System February 9, 2004)
Col. (res.) Shaul Arieli, who was the last commander of the Gaza regional brigade of the IDF, says that the effectiveness of the barrier is only short-term. "The fence provides a partial security response to the terror threats and a good response to prevention of illegal immigration and prevention of criminal acts," he explains, "but on the other hand, in its current format it creates the future terror infrastructure because this terror infrastructure is precisely those people living in enclaves who will support acts of terror as the only possible tool that they perceive as being able to restore them the land, production sources and water wells taken from them." Arieli also said that the barrier is designed to induce the Arabs of the border region to leave so that Israel can expand. (Haaretz, February 18, 2004)
In October 2003, the United States vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution stating:
One week later, a similar resolution was passed by the UN General Assembly 144-4 with 12 abstentions. The resolution said the barrier was "in contradiction to international law," and demanded that Israel "stop and reverse" its construction. Israel called the resolution a "farce".
In December 2003, the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to make an advisory (non-binding) ruling on the "legal consequences arising" from the construction of the barrier. The hearings will begin in February 2004. The Palestinian Authority is not a member of the court but will be allowed to make a submission by virtue of being a UN observer and a co-sponsor of the General Assembly resolution. In January 2004, the court also authorized the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to make submissions.
Israel initially announced that it would cooperate with the court, while noting that advisory rulings of the ICJ are not binding. Israel later made a written submission to the court rejecting the authority of the court to rule on the case, but announced (on February 12) that it would not appear at the court to make oral submissions. Twenty countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and France, have expressed the opinion that the problem should be solved by political rather than judicial means. By the deadline for written submissions, 44 member states of the United Nations had made submissions in addition to the Palestinian Authority and the two organizations mentioned above.
On January 30, 2004, Israel announced officially it does not recognize ICJ authority to rule over the fence issue. Israel also dispatched a 120-pages document, elaborating on the security needs to build the "terror preventation fence" and demonstrating the atrocities commited by Palestinian terrorists. The document also include judicial part with legal accounts supporting Israel's claim that the issue of the barrier is politicial and not in the ICJ authority.
In February 2004, Israel's High Court of Justice began hearing petitions from two Israeli human rights organizations, the Hamoked Centre for the Defense of the Individual and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, against the building of the barrier, referring to the distress it will cause to Palestinians in the area.
Israeli public opinion has been very strongly in favor of the barrier, partly in the hope that it will improve security and partly in the belief (denied by the government) that the barrier marks the eventual border of a Palestinian state. Due to the latter possibility, the settler movement opposes the barrier, though this opposition has waned since it became clear the barrier would be diverted to the east of major Israeli settlements such as Ariel. The majority of the Israeli public holds that the barrier legitimacy comes from Israel's right to self defence.
The Palestinian population and its leadership are unanimously opposed to the barrier. They say that a large number of Palestinians have been separated from their lands or their places of work or study, that many more will be as the barriers near Jerusalem are completed, and that Palestinian institutions in Abu Dis will be prevented from providing services to East Jerusalem residents. The major Israeli human rights organizations, and many international aid organizations that work in the occupied territories, have claimed that the barrier has caused severe disruption to the lives of many Palestinians. However, the Israeli Defence Ministry maintains that every effort is made to minimize this disruption.
More broadly, Palestinian spokespeople, supported by many in the Israeli left-wing and other organizations, claim the barrier will breed further discontent amongst the affected population and add to the security problem rather than solving it.
The Palestinian leadership fears that the barrier will become the de facto border between an enlarged Israel and a future Palestinian state.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said on February 18, 2004:
Official Purpose
Structure and Timeline
Effectiveness
International and Israeli legal aspects
The United Kingdom, Germany, Bulgaria and Cameroon abstained from the vote. The justification given by the U.S. for the veto was that the resolution did not condemn terrorist attacks made by Palestinian groups.Opinions on the barrier
See also
External Links