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A useful general account of pragmatism's origins during the late 19th and early 20th centuries is Menand's The Metaphysical Club. According to Menand, pragmatism took form largely in response to the work of Charles Darwin (evolution, ongoing process, and a non-epistemological view of history), statistics (the recognition of the role of randomness in the unfolding of events, and of the presence of regularity within randomness), American democracy (values of pluralism and consensus applied to knowledge as well as politics), and in particular the American Civil War (a rejection of the sort of absolutizing or dualizing claims (i.e., to Truth) that provide the philosophical underpinnings of war).
Some pragmatists and related thinkers:
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2 Dewey's Pragmatism/Instrumentalism 3 George Herbert Mead |
In William James' view, pragmatism is in the first instance a theory of meaning. He asked us to imagine a man on a camping trip trying to catch a glimpse of a squirrel on the opposite side of a tree. The squirrel is clinging to the trunk, belly against the wood, so that he and the man are directly facing one another, although the tree itself keeps either from seein the other. As the man moves around the tree to try to see the critter, it moves correspondingly, keeping the tree between them.
James asked us to imagine, further, that an argument breaks out within the camping party, whether the man was "going around" the squirrel or not. One faction contends that he was not -- the man and squirrel were face-to-face the whole time, so neither went around the other. To another faction, this seems absurd! -- the man went around the tree, the squirrel was on the tree, so the man necessarily went around the squirrel!
The point of the story was that, in the end, the campers realized they were simply confused by an ambiguity in the phrase "to go around." This ambiguity can be resolved by tracing the "practical consequences" of going around. Do we mean being to the north, east, south, and west of some central object? Then the man went around the squirrel. Do we mean being in front, to the side, in back, and to the other side of that central object? Then the man failed to go around the squirrel. Likewise with such notions as freedom or fate, materialism, pluralism, monism -- we must trace practical consequences to know what we mean by the terms we employ so as to avoid interminable confusion.
James advocated pragmatism as a means of clearing up precisely such confusions which, he believed, were ubiquitous in philosophy.
One of the words to which he applied this approach was truth. He could find no content to the ideas of truth held either by the British empiricists of his day such as Bertrand Russell or in that held by the post_hegelian idealists such as Josiah Royce. Their interminable dispute with one another could only be settled the way the campers' dispute was settled -- by attention to practical consequences. So he offered as the content of truth the hypothesis that it is the expediant in the way of our thinking -- "expediant in almost any fashion; and expediant in the long run and on the whole of course."
James made no sharp distinction between the theory of truth and the theory of knowledge. That distinction became a canonical part of Anglo-American philosophy sometime after James' death in 1910. One might well rephrase James' theory of truth as a theory of knowledge, or of the warrant of true belief, rather than of truth itself.
John Dewey was a college professor, teaching for ten years at the University of Michigan, ten at the University of Chicago, and twenty-six at Columbia University, in New York. He was also something of an organizer within the academic world, serving as president of the American Philosophical Association 1905-06, and soon thereafter helping to found the American Association of University Professors, of which he became the first president in 1915.
As a philosopher, one of Dewey's key conceptions was dualism. His texts consist largely of the hunt for and the demolition of dichotomies, such as the ancient dichotomy between fixed realities and transient illusions.
In a 1919 essay, Dewey wrote that Plato and Aristotle came to believe in "a higher realm of fixed reality of which alone true science is possible and an inferior world of changing things with which experience and practical matters are concerned" because they were frightened by the dangers of the world, and they hoped to escape from those dangers into an impregnable fortress of the mind. He called that essay "Escape from Peril." His own ideal, then, was the contrary one of a naturalistic philosophy (even, one might say, monistically so) that would face peril and persevere in its midst.
If philosophy must work among perils, then theory can't be severed from practice, and ideas however exalted their claims are but instruments for the organisms that live in this transient world --hence, "instrumentalism," as Dewey baptized his version of pragmatism.
Mead studied at Harvard University, as well as the Universities of Leipzig and Berlin. While at Harvard, although he was never a student of William James, he did live in James' home as tutor to his children. It was at Leipzig that he became strongly interested in Darwinism, and his later development of pragmatism was to have a biological flavor.
Mead taught at Michigan, 1891-94, and at Chicago, from 1894 until his death in 1931. He never published a book, but four books appeared in his name after his death, edited by his students from stenographic records of his social psychology course at the University of Chicago and from numerous unpublished papers. Those four books are: The Philosophy of the Present (1932), edited by Arthur E. Murphy; Mind, Self, and Society (1934), edited by Charles W. Morris; Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1936), edited by Merritt H. Moore; and The Philosophy of the Act (1938), Mead's Carus Lectures of 1930, edited by Charles W. Morris.
Mead devoted much of his thought to a theory of communication, i.e. a theory of how "significant symbols" arise from mere gestures. One of his illustrations involved two dogs, circling each other and growling in a hostile manner. Each is gesturing, there is even a "conversation of gestures," but this is not yet language, because the dogs do not know that they are communicating. There is a continuum of possibilities from this encounter to the most complicated and subtle human exchanges.
From such analyses, Mead was lead to a theory of mind that is a variant of behaviorism. He believed that there is no mind or thought without language, and language is a development and product of social behavior.
More on Jamesian Pragmatism
Dewey's Pragmatism/Instrumentalism
George Herbert Mead